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MONGOOSE

8 August 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Stepped Up Course B

You requested a paper on "a possible stepped up Course B as to content, implication and difference from present course of action."

Course B was described in our 25 July team review of Operation Mongoose, as a course of action possible under present U.S. policy. It read: "b. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, without overt employment of U.S. military." The major difference from Phase I of Operation Mongoose would be in removing the restriction, in the 14 March policy guidelines, which kept our actions "short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt within the target area."

As a practical way of getting a meaningful paper to you, for consideration prior to the policy meeting, I held working sessions with the Operational Representatives: Mr. Hurwitch (State), Gen. Harris (Defense), Mr. Harvey (CIA), and Mr. Wilson (USIA). After benefit of discussion, each was tasked with writing a specific section of this paper. The thinking reflects those of responsible representatives, rather than completely staffed positions from participating departments and agencies.

The papers from each representative are attached. The major contribution is from CIA, since CIA would have the main burden in a stepped up Course B. The State, Defense, and USIA papers are essentially reflective of companion roles to CIA's covert activities. USIA has added a "think piece" on anticipated world-wide psychological reaction to a stepped up Course B.

Excluded from automatic
regrading: DoD Dir.
5400.10 does not apply

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Series B


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Considerations

In our Operational Representatives discussions, it was generally acknowledged that a widespread revolt of the Cuban people against the regime might well lead to an open appeal by Cubans for help by U.S. military forces, as the regime's security forces attempt to crush the revolt.



At the close of the attached CIA section on "covert activities," there is a list of policy approvals deemed required. It is suggested that this be read in context with the CIA operational suggestions as outlined in the section. It is noted that authority would be required for overflights (resupply, leaflet drops, infiltration, exfiltration), use of U.S. submarines for infiltration and exfiltration, major sabotage operations, stepped up psychological actions



In the "covert activities" section, it is noted that CIA would support State in any feasible action to develop individual Latin American country support and would provide covert support to the CRC and appropriate Cuban groups, to assist in the achievement of the goal of Operation Mongoose.

My own comment is to urge that you give the fullest possible consideration to the concept of actions by Cuban groups, and actions from and by Latin American countries, to achieve the goal of Operation Mongoose. Consideration of this concept is urged, since it alone could offer making the responsibility for initiative and actions reside in groups and countries other than the U.S. If a support concept is possible which would permit U.S. assets to assist such non-U.S. operations, with reasonable assurance of mutual objectives and methods, then this would be the most desirable concept for winning our goal.

Attachments

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"Special Handling" numbered copies to:

Special Group (Series A)

1. General Taylor
2. Mr. Johnson
3. Mr. Gilpatric

4. Mr. McCone
5. Mr. Kennedy
6. General Lamnitzer

Added (Series B)

1. Mr. Bundy
2. Mr. Rusk

3. Mr. McNamara
4. Mr. Murrow

Operational Representatives (Series B)

5. Mr. Hurwitch (State)
6. General Harris (Defense)
7. Mr. Harvey (CIA)
8. Mr. Wilson (USIA)
- 9/10 Chief of Operations

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POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

Robert A. Hurwitch, Department of State Representative for Operation Mongoose, states:

It should be recognized at the outset that short of the employment of U.S. military force the programs and actions of the U.S. aimed at the downfall of the Castro Government will probably be only marginal as compared to the policies and actions of the Castro Government itself and those of the USSR. Despite the preponderance of power presently at the disposal of the Castro Government, however, the deteriorating and mis-managed Cuban economy coupled with a generally discontented and volatile people whose lives are becoming increasingly regimented provide some of the ingredients of an uprising against the regime. U.S. actions may in this unstable situation provide the necessary spark; they may not. Since there are no scientific means of determining which actions offer assurances of success, we can only probe and experiment. In so doing, however, we should avoid engaging U.S. prestige openly in operations, the success of which may be doubtful.

The present course of action with respect to Cuba involves the exercise of all feasible political, economic and psychological pressures, as well as limited covert activities within Cuba, designed to make the Castro Government's survival more difficult and to isolate Cuba from the Hemisphere, thereby detracting from its value to the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and reducing its capability to threaten the peace and security of the Hemisphere. This course of action has undoubtedly contributed to an advance toward these objectives over the past year.

Under a stepped up Course B, the actions that might feasibly be undertaken by the Department of State are limited in scope. The Department would continue to invest political capital in courses of action designed to weaken, isolate and eventually effect the downfall of the Castro Government whenever it reasonably appeared that the benefits from each course of action would outweigh the losses for the free world.

A stepped up Course B would appear to involve primarily an increase in covert activities which might stimulate the creation of

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organized internal resistance to the Castro Government. Of the variety of such covert activities a program of systematic sabotage warrants serious consideration. (Added note on page 4.)

It may be reasonably argued that a program of sabotage should not be undertaken until an organized base of political opposition already exists in Cuba. It may be equally persuasively argued, however, that a program of sabotage may contribute significantly to the creation of such a base of political opposition. Since organized political opposition does not now exist in Cuba, a program of sabotage may prove to be the means of developing one. This program is visualized as three-fold: supply of sabotage materiel to Cubans in Cuba who are not under U S. control; supply of sabotage materiel and instructions as to targets to Cubans in Cuba under our control; and sabotage of targets by Cubans under our control who arrive in Cuba, destroy the target, and withdraw from Cuba. Priority should be given to targets of economic importance, the destruction of which would result in the minimum possible loss of life. Terroristic acts of sabotage should be ruled out.

A second area of covert activities which might contribute to the formation of organized opposition to the Castro Government is that of improved techniques of propaganda beamed to the Cuban people. Consideration should be given to seeking the establishment of a powerful, medium wave radio station in a friendly country on the Caribbean perimeter, operated by selected Cuban refugees.

There follow a list of overt political and economic actions which the Department of State might undertake under a stepped up Course B, with advantages and disadvantages briefly noted where pertinent:

POLITICAL

A. Be prepared to initiate action or support another American Republic's initiative against Cuba in the OAS or subordinate inter-American organization, as the appropriate occasion arises.

Advantage: Such action would continue to place the Cuban problem in a multilateral context, thereby advancing the "Hemisphere versus Cuba" impression.

Disadvantage: If poor judgment were exercised and an inappropriate occasion chosen for OAS action, such action could place on public display sharp division among the OAS member states and could serve to weaken the inter-American system.

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B. Continue and intensify, where possible and necessary, the diplomatic and political campaign to inform free world governments and peoples of the nature and activities of the Castro Government and urge them, as appropriate, to undertake all feasible actions which would undermine the Castro Government and demonstrate solidarity with the Cuban people.

Advantage: Continuance of this campaign, where successful, would serve to isolate and weaken further the Castro Government.

Disadvantage: If overdone, such a campaign could result in other nations and peoples regarding the U.S. as immature and neurotic with respect to the subject of Cuba, since, in many instances, they do not regard the existence of the Castro Government with the same degree of concern as does the U.S.

C. Encourage Latin American Governments to take steps to prevent their nationals from traveling to Cuba.

Advantage: This action would contribute to isolating Cuba and reducing its capability of subversive activities in the Hemisphere.

Disadvantage: Most Latin American nations do not have legislation which provides for control over travel of its nationals to specific countries. Attempts to obtain such legislation with respect to travel to Cuba could create serious local political problems.

D. Be prepared to exploit by diplomatic and other means, any indication of a split in the regime from which there may emerge significant anti-Castro/communist elements.

E. Continue and intensify where possible and necessary, U.S. efforts to strengthen the democratic sectors in Latin America under the Alliance for Progress program in order to improve their capabilities of countering Castro-communist threats to political stability and orderly economic and social development.

F. Continue the program of seeking hard evidence of Cuban subversive activities in the Hemisphere.

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G. Exploit all feasible opportunities for denying markets in the free world for Cuban exports.

Advantage: This action, where successful, would exacerbate Cuba's already precarious foreign exchange position and further reduce its ability to purchase vital equipment in the free world.

Disadvantage: In some instances, Cuban exports are less expensive than are similar products from alternate sources. Under these circumstances, the U.S. might be compelled to subsidize the alternate sources, an operation for which funds are not currently available.

H. Exploit all feasible opportunities for preventing the shipment of critical spare parts and equipment from free world sources to Cuba.

Added note on sabotage

Distinction should be made between major and dramatic sabotage acts and those that might be characterized as irritants or harassment: for example, complete destruction of oil refineries or power plants as compared to temporary impairment of sugar refineries or cutting of power lines. With respect to the first category, such acts should not be isolated events but rather should be accompanied by other actions in Cuba which might have resulted from the particular act of sabotage or of which the act of sabotage might have been the result. Acts of sabotage of the second category might be isolated events.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL

Donald M. Wilson, USIA Representative for Operation Mongoose, states:

Under stepped-up Course B there would be two psychological tasks:

1. Increase the flow of information to Cuba, exposing the weaknesses and perfidies of the Castro/Communist regime.
2. Improve the informational capability throughout Latin America to "isolate" Castro/Communism and build up support for pro-democratic Cuban elements.

1. Increase the flow of information to Cuba.

a. Where other access is denied us, radio is the best means to reach the Cuban people. It is USIA's view that our short wave capability (VOA) is operating at the most efficient technical level, with nine hours of broadcasting a day in Spanish. Three of the nine hours are devoted specifically to Cuba, while the other six concern themselves with the rest of Latin America. All are heard clearly in Cuba and will be heard much more clearly in December, 1962, when our new transmitter in Greenville, North Carolina, goes on the air.

The establishment of a medium wave capability would be desirable. It is indeed possible to broadcast a strong signal into Cuba, and USIA has made a study of ten possible sites to locate transmitters (reported separately). Our study also shows, however, that Castro has the ready capability to jam our effort with an extraordinarily high percentage of success. Faced with Castro's capability, should the U.S. undertake construction of a powerful broadcasting facility at an estimated cost of eight million dollars and an estimated building time of fifteen months? It is always possible that Castro would not utilize his jamming capability and the U.S. would therefore have a successful medium-wave operation into Cuba. Should an uprising occur, the opportunities presented by such a U.S. medium-wave capability would be great. Should there be an ultimate military action by the United States, the opportunities of such a capability would also be great. However, if none of these contingencies occur, we will have an expensive operation on our hands with small listenership to show for it.

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b.

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2. Improve the information capability throughout Latin America

Our capability will depend on the availability of funds. The Latin American program was stepped-up 32 percent in Fiscal Year '62 and it will be stepped-up 26 percent more in Fiscal Year '63, so the availability of even more funds is a real problem.

Here are examples of current programming which could be augmented:

1) Radio. We could step up our production of packaged radio programs for placement on radio stations throughout Latin America.

2) Cartoon Books. The Agency has done six anti-Castro cartoon books (5 million copies) having a widespread impact over the area. This program could be stepped-up.

3) Motion Pictures. The Agency has produced an animated film on Cuban land reform theme and has two more films in the pipeline. An increased production of films, although expensive, could be instituted.

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4) Television. Television reaches a growing audience in Latin America. The Agency has done one TV "Special" on Castro, and has acquired others from commercial producers. Currently the Agency is doing an anti-Communist TV series which will document the methods and results of Castroism. Vast new opportunities are available in this medium. For example, we could do a puppet series to poke fun at Castro, a device with vast appeal to Latinos.

5) Books. Our book program has several good anti-Castro titles although the circulation is small. We have already asked Congress for a supplemental appropriation to distribute five million books next year in Latin America. Some of these will have an anti-Castro theme.

6) Refugees. We could make an even greater use of the Cuban refugee story through all media. For example, we could do more TV shorts on Cuban refugees at work (in garages, driving taxis, clerking, and so on.) We could more fully exploit the Negro defectors.

Following are some possibilities for new programming:

1. [REDACTED]

2. Subsidize a troupe of Cuban dancers, musicals, singers in one big show to tour Latin America. Ample talent is available among the refugees. [REDACTED]

3. Organize a show by Cuban painters, cartoonists, sculptors on one theme -- perhaps the executions -- to be sent around Latin America.

4. Develop a speakers' bureau throughout Latin America to send lecturers before all types of groups. [REDACTED]

5. Develop a series of hard-hitting exhibits on various anti-Castro themes, and get them displayed in key locations all over Latin America.

It is USIA's view that the most effective information program in Latin America must have a positive theme. That is why the majority of our output is still devoted to support of the Alliance for Progress. Our anti-Castro output, being essentially negative in nature, still is relegated to a less important position. We believe this accent on the positive to be most desirable and should there be an increase in anti-Castro material we would believe it necessary to similarly increase our positive support material for the Alliance for Progress.

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Advantages of Stepped-up Course B:

- a. It would raise the hopes of the anti-Castro Cubans and check their tendency to grow complacent and settle into U.S. ways.
- b. It would tend to bring together the various Cuban anti-Castro factions.
- c. It would call forth the heightened attention of the rest of Latin America to the Castro/Communist regime.

Disadvantages:

- a. World opinion, particularly in Europe, would become suspicious of "intervention."
- b. A higher noise level will be accompanied by a higher risk of exposure of the program.

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MILITARY

General Benjamin T. Harris, DOD/JCS Representative for Operation Mongoose, states:

1. Support: Within its capabilities DOD is prepared to provide all required support to CIA, State and USIA necessary to the accomplishment of the objectives of Operation Mongoose.

2. Military Readiness: If there is a decision to use U.S. military force, execution of our military contingency plans for Cuba will be undertaken as rapidly as the posture of our forces will allow at the time the decision is made.

a.



b.



c. In concept, initial military operations commence with an air and naval blockade, concentrated air strikes, and coordinated naval gunfire to effect destruction of enemy airpower and to neutralize and destroy as much as possible of the enemy armor, artillery and anti-air capability.

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